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Abstract
Given the observed cosmic acceleration, Leonard Susskind has presented
the following argument against the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal for
the quantum state of the universe: It should most likely lead to a nearly
empty large de Sitter universe, rather than to early rapid inflation. Even if
one adds the condition of observers, they are most likely to form by quantum
fluctuations in de Sitter and therefore not see the structure that we observe.
Here I present my own amplified version of this argument and consider possible
resolutions, one of which seems to imply that inflation expands the universe
to be larger than 1010
10
122
Mpc.
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Introduction
Our part (or subuniverse [1] or bubble universe [2, 3] or pocket universe [4]) of the
entire universe (or multiverse [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] or metauniverse [13] or omnium
[14] or megaverse [15] or holocosm [16]) is observed to be highly special in a way
that does not seem to be implied purely by the known dynamical laws. For example,
it is seen to be very large on the Planck scale, with low large-scale curvature, and
with approximate homogeneity and isotropy of the matter distribution on the largest
scales that we can see today. It especially seems to have a very high degree of order
in the early universe that has enabled entropy to increase, as described by the second
law of thermodynamics [17, 18, 19].
Two leading proposals for special quantum states of the universe are the Hartle-
Hawking ‘no-boundary’ proposal [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29] and the
‘tunneling’ proposal of Vilenkin, Linde, and others [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35]. In toy
models incorporating presumed approximations for these proposals, both of these
models have seemed to lead to low-entropy early universes and so might explain
the second law of thermodynamics. If a suitable inflaton is present in the effective
low-energy dynamical theory, and if sufficient inflation occurs, both proposals have
seemed to lead to approximate homogeneity and isotropy today.
Here I shall focus on the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal, in which the
wavefunction of the universe (expressed as a functional of the 3-dimensional geome-
try and matter field configuration on a spatial 3-surface that in some sense represents
the universe at any one moment of time) is given by a path integral over all compact
Euclidean 4-dimensional geometries and matter fields that have the 3-dimensional
geometry and matter field configuration as its only boundary. (Because of this one
boundary of the 4-geometries, where the wavefunction is evaluated, one might say
that the proposal would be better named the Hartle-Hawking ‘one-boundary’ pro-
posal [28], but here I shall continue to use the usual nomenclature.) This model
is certainly incomplete for various technical reasons [36, 37, 38, 28], but in simple
toy models, it seems to predict several special features of the observed universe
[21, 22, 39, 40, 23, 41, 26, 28]: Lorentzian signature, large size, near-critical density,
low anisotropies, inhomogeneities starting in ground states to fit cosmic microwave
background radiation (CMB) data, and entropy starting low to explain the second
law of thermodynamics.
However, Leonard Susskind [42] (cf. [43, 44, 45]) has argued that the cosmo-
logical constant or quintessence or dark energy that is the source of the present
observations of the cosmic acceleration [46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52] would give a large
Euclidean 4-hemisphere as an extremum of the Hartle-Hawking path integral that
would apparently swamp the extremum from rapid early inflation. Therefore, to
very high probability, the present universe should be very nearly empty de Sitter
spacetime, which is certainly not what we observe.
This argument is a variant of Vilenkin’s old objection [53] that the no-boundary
proposal favors a small amount of inflation, whereas the tunneling wavefunction
favors a large amount. Other papers that have attacked the Hartle-Hawking wave-
function include [54, 55, 56]. However, Susskind was the first to impress upon me
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the challenge to the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal from the recent cosmic
acceleration.
Of course, it may be pointed out that most of de Sitter spacetime would not
have observers and so would not be observed at all, so just the fact that such
an unobserved universe dominates the path integral is not necessarily contrary to
what we do observe. To make observations, we are restricted to the parts of the
universe which have observers. One should not just take the bare probabilities
for various configurations (such as empty de Sitter spacetime in comparison with
a spacetime that might arise from a period of rapid early inflation). Rather, one
should consider conditional probabilities of what observers would see, conditional
upon their existence [13, 57, 29].
However, the bare probability of an empty de Sitter spacetime forming by a large
4-hemisphere extremum of the Hartle-Hawking path integral dominates so strongly
over that of a spacetime with an early period of rapid inflation that even when one
includes the factor of the tiny conditional probability for an observer to appear by a
vacuum fluctuation in empty de Sitter, the joint probability for that fluctuation in de
Sitter dominates over the probability to form an inflationary universe and thereafter
observers by the usual evolutionary means. Therefore, the argument goes, almost
all observers will be formed by fluctuations in nearly empty de Sitter, rather than
by the processes that we think occurred in our apparently inflationary universe.
The problem then is that almost all of these fluctuation-observers will not see
any significant ordered structures around them, such as the ordered large-scale uni-
verse we observe. Thus our actual observations would be highly atypical in this
no-boundary wavefunction, counting as strong observational evidence against this
theory (if the calculation of these probabilities has indeed been done correctly). As
Dyson, Kleban, and Susskind put it in a more general challenge to theories with a
cosmological constant [43], “The danger is that there are too many possibilities which
are anthropically acceptable, but not like our universe.” See [58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63]
for further descriptions of this general problem.
To express this in a slightly different way, if A are the conditions for observations,
and if B are the conditions for ordered observations, we want a theory giving the
conditional probability P (B|A) not too many orders of magnitude smaller than
unity, since we see B. But if the no-boundary quantum state produces A mostly by
de Sitter fluctuations, it seems that it gives P (B|A)≪ 1.
The general nature of this objection was forcefully expressed by Eddington 75
years ago [64]: “The crude assertion would be that (unless we admit something
which is not chance in the architecture of the universe) it is practically certain
that at any assigned date the universe will be almost in the state of maximum
disorganization. The amended assertion is that (unless we admit something which
is not chance in the architecture of the universe) it is practically certain that a
universe containing mathematical physicists will at any assigned date be in the
state of maximum disorganization which is not inconsistent with the existence of
such creatures. I think it is quite clear that neither the original nor the amended
version applies. We are thus driven to admit anti-chance; and apparently the best
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thing we can do with it is to sweep it up into a heap at the beginning of time.”
In Eddington’s language, Susskind’s challenge is that the Hartle-Hawking no-
boundary proposal seems to lead to pure chance (the high-entropy nearly-empty
de Sitter spacetime), whereas to meet the challenge, we need to show instead that
somehow in the very early universe (near, if not at, the “beginning of time”) it
actually leads to anti-chance, something far from a maximal entropy state.
Of course, another possibility is simply that the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary
proposal is wrong. Hawking himself admitted this possibility [65] (cf. also [29]):
“I’d like to emphasize that this idea that time and space should be finite without
boundary is just a proposal: it cannot be deduced from some other principle. Like
any other scientific theory, it may initially be put forward for aesthetic or meta-
physical reasons, but the real test is whether it makes predictions that agree with
observation.” Susskind is making the argument that its predictions do not agree
with observation.
Numerical Illustrations
Let us make a numerical illustration of this problem. For simplicity and concreteness,
let us take ΩΛ = 0.72 ± 0.04 from the third-year WMAP results of [50] and H0 =
72±8 km/s/Mpc from the Hubble Space Telescope key project [66], and let us drop
the error uncertainties. In Planck units, h¯ = c = G = 1, this gives H0 ≈ 1.3× 10−61
and Λ = 3ΩλH
2
0 ≈ 3.4×10−122, which would give a Euclidean 4-hemisphere of radius
adS =
√
3/Λ ≈ 9.4 × 1060 and a Euclidean action of SE(de Sitter) = −πa2dS/2 ≈
−1.4× 10122. This extremum of the Hartle-Hawking path integral would thus give
an unnormalized bare probability of
Pbare(de Sitter) = e
−2SE(dS) = epia
2
dS = e3pi/Λ ∼ e10122.44 . (1)
Now we need to ask, given this de Sitter spacetime, what is the probability of
having an observer or observation. I do not know what the minimum requirement
for an observation is, but it certainly seems sufficient to have a human brain in the
right state for a sufficient time. If we assume that a human brain of minimum mass,
say, 1 kg, can make an observation in a very short time if it is in the right state,
then the minimum requirement would be for the brain to fluctuate into existence in
a region of size, say, r = 30 cm, that is separate from the antimatter that would also
exist during the vacuum fluctuation. This gives a dimensionless action of (cf. [67])
SE(brief brain) ∼ Er
h¯c
∼ (1 kg)(3× 10
8 m/s)(0.3 m)
10−34 J · s ∼ 10
42. (2)
This will then give a conditional probability of each brain state, in some region of
de Sitter spacetime just large enough to contain the brain, given that that spacetime
exists, of about e−2SE(brain) ∼ e−1042 . This should be multiplied by the number of
orthogonal brain states within the region that would correspond to an observation,
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and by the number of spacetime regions where the observer can fluctuate into exis-
tence and make an observation, in order to give P (brain state|de Sitter). However,
for simplicity let us assume that the product of these numbers is much less than
e10
42
and so does not much change the upper exponent (42).
A more conservative assumption [68] would be that a human observer requires
a 1 kg brain to last a time long enough for neural signals to travel across it, say 0.1
second. The dimensionless action for this is
SE(medium brain) ∼ E∆t
h¯
∼ (1 kg)(3× 10
8 m/s)2(0.1 s)
10−34 J · s ∼ 10
50. (3)
An even more conservative assumption would be that the brain should be a
thermal fluctuation into a real existence from the de Sitter temperature TdS =
1/(2πadS) = 1.70× 10−62, which gives a Boltzmann probability factor of
exp (−2SE(long brain)) with
SE(long brain) =
πadSE
h¯c
≈ 1.4× 1069. (4)
Effectively this assumption was used in [59] to calculate the time for a ‘Boltzmann
brain’ (BB) [69, 11, 70] to appear in the local viewpoint considered there, tBB ∼
exp (2SE(long brain)); here I shall suggest that it might be more realistic to use the
smaller brief brain (bb) time tbb ∼ exp (2SE(brief brain)) ∼ e1042 in that viewpoint.
In [68] I used SE(medium brain) ∼ 1050 to estimate that if the de Sitter spacetime
lasts longer than about 1050t0 ∼ 1060 years, then the spacetime 4-volume would be
so large that one would expect many observers to fluctuate into existence in it,
rather than having just a very low probability per de Sitter spacetime. An even
more severe problem seems to occur if the spacetime decays probabilistically with a
half-life greater than about 20 billion years, since then the expectation value of the
4-volume per comoving 3-volume would diverge in the future and produce an infinite
number of fluctuation observers or Boltzmann brains [58, 61, 63]. However, here let
us assume either that the de Sitter spacetime will not last so long, or else that
there are other ways of circumventing these problems, such as the ones suggested in
[59, 60, 62].
Combining the unnormalized bare probability for nearly empty de Sitter with the
most conservative conditional probability for an observation within such a de Sitter
spacetime gives the unnormalized probability of an observation from the Euclidean
de Sitter extremum as
Pobservation,unnormalized(de Sitter) ∼ exp (+10122.44 − 1069.4). (5)
In comparison, let us calculate the probability of forming an observer through an
inflationary universe. In this case observers can presumably develop through normal
Lorentzian evolution (with paths in the path integral having real Lorentzian action
or purely imaginary Euclidean action during the Lorentzian part of the evolution)
after one has Lorentzian inflation, so there will not be the huge suppression factor
of about e−10
42
, e−10
50
, or e−10
69.4
that occurs in empty de Sitter. This by itself
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certainly makes it sound as if more observers ought to be produced by inflation
than by empty de Sitter. However, in the Euclidean path integral of the Hartle-
Hawking no-boundary proposal, one also needs to compare the bare probability
of producing the inflationary universe, which seems to be much, much less than
the bare probability of producing a large de Sitter spacetime directly by the large
Euclidean 4-dimensional hemisphere extremum.
Although the details are unimportant for the qualitative result of the argu-
ment, for concreteness let us consider inflation driven by a single scalar field φ
with potential V (φ). In the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary path integral, inflation
can start by an extremum of the action that has a nearly-round Euclidean small
4-dimensional hemisphere with nearly constant scalar field value φ0, radius squared
a20 ≈ 3/[8πV (φ0)], and Euclidean action SE(inflation) ≈ −πa20/2 ≈ 3/[16V(φ0)].
In the account of Liddle and Lyth [71], who use the reduced Planck mass MPl =
(8πG/h¯c)−1/2 = 1/
√
8π ≈ 0.20 in terms of the usual Planck units h¯ = c = G = 1,
the magnitude of the scalar density perturbations from inflation is given by
PR(k) =
(
H
φ˙
)2 (
H
2π
)2
=
1
24π2M4Pl
V
ǫ
=
8V
3ǫ
, (6)
where
ǫ ≡ ǫ(φ) = M
2
Pl
2
(
V ′
V
)2
≡ 1
16π
(
1
V
dV
dφ
)2
(7)
is one of the slow-roll parameters [71] that I am assuming is much less than unity,
and everything is to be evaluated at horizon exit for wavenumber k = aH .
The Liddle-Lyth quantity PR(k) seems to be the same quantity called ∆R(k),
the amplitude of curvature perturbations, in the WMAP analysis [50], which at
a wavenumber of k = 0.002/Mpc is given in terms of the amplitude of density
fluctuations, A, as 29.5 × 10−10A. Table 5 of the 3-year WMAP data [50] gives
A ≈ 0.8, so I shall take that as a representative value below.
Now if for simplicity and concreteness we suppose that the inflaton potential has
a power-law form with exponent α, say V = λM4−αPl φ
α, then the slow-roll parameter
is ǫ = (1/2)α2M2Pl/φ
2 ≈ α/(4N), where N is the number of e-folds of inflation from
that value of φ to the end of inflation at φend ≈ αMPl/
√
2, assuming that φ≫ φend.
In terms of these quantities, if the nearly-round Euclidean 4-hemisphere has the
nearly-constant scalar field value φ0 (which can be interpreted to be very nearly
the initial value for the Lorentzian inflation that is the analytic continuation of the
Euclidean 4-hemisphere), and if φ0 is taken as a lower limit for the value that causes
the horizon exit at what is now the fiducial wavenumber of k = 0.002/Mpc, then
the Euclidean action of the 4-hemisphere is, roughly,
SE
>∼ − 1
2ǫ∆R
≈ − 2N
α∆R
= −6.78× 108 N
αA
≈ −2× 1010, (8)
where for the very last number I have taken α = 2 for the 1
2
m2φ2 potential that
does seem to fit the WMAP data [50] better than the λφ4 potential with α = 4,
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and I have used the value N = 50 from [71] and the value A = 0.8 from [50]. This
result also agrees well with the result of using m = 7.5 × 10−6 = 1.5 × 10−6 and
φ0 = φ∗ = 14MPl = 2.8 for the
1
2
m2φ2 potential from the example on page 252
of [71]. Very, very crudely, when φ0 is not much larger than the value of φ giving
k = 0.002/Mpc, then this Euclidean action goes as the inverse square of a typical
galactic peculiar velocity (in units of the speed of light, of course), multiplied by
N that is very roughly a logarithm of the ratio of some energy in the range of the
Planck energy to some energy in the range of atomic energies.
Then if I use this estimate for a lower bound on the Euclidean action for the
4-hemisphere, the unnormalized bare probability for inflation becomes
Pbare(inflation) = e
−2SE(inflation) = epia
2
0 = e3/[8V(φ0)]
<∼ e1010.6 . (9)
If φ0 were taken to be larger, which is certainly consistent with the observa-
tions that only place a minimum value on the number of e-folds of inflation, then
Pbare(inflation) would be smaller, asymptotically approaching unity as V (φ0) ap-
proaches infinity with the ever-rising potential.
If inflation does occur, then one would expect the conditional probability of
observers to be of the order of unity (not suppressed by a Euclidean fluctuation
action), so one would get
Pobservation,unnormalized(inflation)
<∼ e1010.6 . (10)
This is much less than Pobservation,unnormalized(de Sitter), so if we normalize be dividing
by the total unnormalized probability for observations, we get that the normalized
probability for an observation to occur in an inflationary solution (rather than from
a fluctuation in nearly empty de Sitter) would be
Pobservation(inflation)
<∼ exp
(
−10122.44 + 1069.4 + 1010.6
)
. (11)
In fact, if one just asks for the normalized probability of an ordered observation,
that would much more likely occur from a fluctuation in the large nearly-empty de
Sitter than in an inflationary universe, so
Pobservation(order) ∼ number of brain states with ordered observations
number of brain states with any observations
. (12)
This would still be expected to be a fraction much less than unity, depending
on how ordered the observation is required to be. (For example, one might expect
that the fraction of observations with, say, 1000 ordered bits of information would
be of the order of 2−1000). Therefore, according to these probabilities given by this
approximate calculation in a toy minisuperspace-plus-homogeneous-inflaton model,
it would be very improbable for an observation chosen randomly from the predictions
of the model to have the order that we see in our actual observations. That is, our
actual observations would be highly atypically ordered according to this model, and
this fact counts as strong observational evidence against the model.
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The conclusion of Susskind’s argument [42], which I have expanded in my own
words here, is that the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal for the quantum state
of the universe is inconsistent with our observations.
I indeed take this as a very serious objection to the no-boundary proposal, for
which I do have not seen or thought of a rebuttal that I would regard as completely
satisfactory. However, since this proposal has in the past (at least in highly approxi-
mate toy models) seemed to provide solutions for a number of deep cosmic mysteries
(perhaps foremost the explanation of the very low entropy of the very early universe
necessary to explain the second law of thermodynamics), I am loathe to give it up.
Therefore, I would like to regard Susskind’s objection not so much as a no-go the-
orem but more as a challenge (to discover either how to save the Hartle-Hawking
proposal or how to replace it).
Possible Resolutions
In this spirit, let me consider various possible resolutions to Susskind’s challenge
to the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal, though readily admitting that none I
have thought of yet seems to be completely satisfactory.
(1) The first conceivable resolution to Susskind’s challenge is that for some un-
known reason observers can’t form from fluctuations in nearly-empty de Sitter space-
time (or for some reason they have probabilities suppressed enormously much more
greatly than that calculated above for a brain to last 0.1 seconds).
A separate motivation for this possibility is the calculation of [68] that if our
current accelerating universe lasts longer than about 1050t0 ∼ 10111 ∼ 1060 years
into the future, the comoving 4-volume corresponding to the Solar System, say,
would have far more observers produced by vacuum fluctuations than are likely to
exist from ordinary life on Earth over the entire history of the Solar System. The
results of [58, 61, 63] imply that this problem could arise from a quantum half-life
as low as 20 billion years (rather than an end to the universe at a definite time that
could be as long as ∼ 1060 years in the future [68]). Therefore, even if we exclude
nearly-empty de Sitter spacetimes formed in the Hartle-Hawking path integral, it
would seem that our ordered observations would be highly atypical even within what
we think is happening in our part of the universe, if it lasts long enough.
Of course, one possibility is that our part of the universe does not last this long
(at least while expanding exponentially at roughly the present rate) [72, 73, 74, 75,
76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 68, 58, 61, 63]. Perhaps the current slow cosmic acceleration is
not caused by a cosmological constant (or by a scalar field at a positive minimum of
its potential, which is effectively essentially the same thing if the tunneling rate out
from this minimum is negligible in 1060 years). Perhaps instead it is due to a scalar
field that is slowly sliding down a potential with a slope [72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78,
79, 80, 68] that is very small but which is sufficient for the potential to go negative
and lead to a big crunch within 1060 years. (The observational evidence presented in
[68] only gave a lower limit of about 26 billion years in the future, assuming that the
potential is not convex. Improved measurements of the w parameter are expected
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to give a gradual improvement of this lower limit, but it seems totally unrealistic
to expect the observational lower limit to be raised to 1060 years within the near
future, by which of course I mean within some humanly accessible time scale≪ 1060
years.)
However, it would seem to require extraordinary fine tuning to have a potential
with a small enough nonzero slope to be consistent with our observations and yet
allow the universe to slide into oblivion. Having a minimum of the potential of
low enough value to give the observed cosmic expansion might be explained by the
anthropic principle (restricting attention to probabilities conditional upon observers)
[81, 82], but there does not seem to be any obvious similar argument why the current
very low value (in Planck units) of the potential should also be accompanied by a
very low nonzero value of the slope. It would seem much more likely that one were at
a minimum of a potential than that one were at a low value of a potential that also
has a gradual slope extending far enough to lead to negative values for the potential
(and hence an eventual big crunch for the universe). Therefore, one is tempted to
look for other resolutions of the problem posed by the possibility of the production
of observers by vacuum fluctuations.
One possibility for this is that observers require nonzero globally conserved quan-
tities that are almost entirely absent in nearly-empty de Sitter spacetime. However,
this would seem to require that observers must extend over the entire space, or else
one could simply have a fluctuation in which the required value of the conserved
quantity appeared in the smaller region where the observer is, and then the comple-
mentary region would have the negative of this quantity, so that the total quantity
over the entire space remains zero [68]. It seems rather implausible to propose that as
observers, each of us extends over all of space, though one might note that similarly
counter-intuitive things seem to occur in the representation of a bulk gravitational
quantum state on the conformal boundary in the AdS/CFT correspondence.
Therefore, I cannot rule out the possibility that nearly-empty de Sitter space
cannot produce observers by vacuum fluctuations, but it does seem rather far-fetched
to me to suppose that it cannot.
(2) A second conceivable resolution of Susskind’s challenge is that the Euclidean
action of the inflationary universe can be made very large and negative by connecting
it by a thin bridge or tube or thread to a large Euclidean de Sitter 4-sphere, thereby
making its Euclidean action even more negative than that of pure Euclidean de
Sitter without inflation [83, 29]. However, then the question would be that if this
were possible, why not also have the nearly-empty de Sitter itself also connected
by a bridge to another large 4-sphere to reduce its action as well and keep it more
negative than that of the inflationary universe? Furthermore, if one allowed one
bridge to another 4-space of negative action, what prevents there from having an
arbitrarily large number of bridges connecting to an arbitrarily large number of 4-
spaces of negative action, thereby making the Euclidean action unbounded below?
This would then seem to make the theory degenerate into nonsense.
So for this second possibility to be valid, it would seem that there must be some
unknown principle that allows an inflationary universe to be connected to a large
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Euclidean de Sitter 4-sphere, but not for the nearly-empty de Sitter 4-hemisphere
to be similarly connected to something else to reduce its action similarly.
One proposal that might be sufficient to rule out the catastrophe of an arbitrary
number of bridges connecting some space in the path integral to an arbitrary number
of 4-spaces of negative action would be that one should approximate the Euclidean
path integral by a sum only over actual extrema of the action, real or complex
Euclidean solutions of the Einstein equations coupled to the matter fields [28]. It
would seem likely that this would allow either of the two extrema discussed above,
the large 4-dimensional hemisphere (which analytically extends into the Lorentzian
regime as nearly-empty de Sitter spacetime) and the Euclidean inflationary solution
(with its tiny approximately round 4-dimensional hemisphere followed by its ana-
lytical extension to a Lorentzian inflationary universe), but perhaps not solutions
with an arbitrary number of bridges connecting different large Euclidean regions
with large negative action. (When one considers the amplitude for observers, one
could still take just complex classical solutions, but now slightly inhomogeneous ones
that end up with the perturbed final 3-space having an observer configuration as a
fluctuation that would raise the real part of the Euclidean action in the de Sitter
case but mainly just give an imaginary correction to the Euclidean action in the
inflationary case.)
(3) This leads to the third conceivable resolution, which is that there is an actual
extremum connecting the inflationary solution to a large negative-action Euclidean
de Sitter, but none connecting two Euclidean de Sitter spaces. Then there would be
a (probably complex) Euclidean solution of the field equations with huge negative
action (from the Euclidean de Sitter part) and yet having a part that analytically
continues to a Lorentzian inflationary universe that can explain our observations,
without there being a solution with even more negative Euclidean action (say from
two Euclidean de Sitter solutions somehow connected together to make a new solu-
tion with more negative action). Such an inflationary solution with a huge negative
action would almost necessarily be inhomogeneous, which might make it difficult
to discover. There is no evidence that I am aware of that strongly suggests its
existence, but then there is none I know that would rule it out either.
This suggested resolution has the advantage that in principle one could look for
an explicit realization, though it might be difficult. The main trouble that I see
with it is that it seems somewhat implausible to me that an inflationary solution
would have an extension (a modified solution that includes a much larger complex
Euclidean region, not just an extension of the same solution), still as a solution of the
field equations, that includes a region giving huge negative action, if one cannot do
the same for the Euclidean de Sitter solution. And even if one somehow succeeded
in finding such an extension of the inflationary solution, it might be difficult to prove
that there is no analogous extension of the Euclidean de Sitter solution. Therefore,
at present I would regard this conceivable resolution as quite speculative, though it
would be very exciting if one could find an actual complex solution of the character
outlined above (with the appropriate nonsingular Euclidean boundary conditions
of the no-boundary proposal). Such an actual mathematical solution would be of
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greater scientific value than many of the speculative proposals I am desperately
tossing out for consideration in this paper.
(4) A fourth conceivable resolution, rather going in the opposite direction from
that of the previous one, is that Euclidean de Sitter is not an allowed extremum of
the path integral with a cosmological constant. It would seem likely that even if one
attempts to make the Hartle-Hawking path integral manageable by restricting the
sum to extrema, one might need to restrict the sum only to a certain subset of all
complex extrema.
For example, it was found in one calculation [21] for a 3-dimensional sphere of size
smaller than the equatorial 3-sphere of the 4-sphere solution for the chosen value of
the cosmological constant, that even though there were two classical solutions (one
in which the 3-sphere boundary bounded less than half of the 4-sphere, and the other
in which it bounded more than half), only the solution with the 3-sphere bounding
less than half of the 4-sphere contributed to a preferred contour integral for the path
integral (and even though the other solution had lower Euclidean action).
It also might be expected that one could have complex Euclidean solutions that
wind around various singularities [84, 28], and that the real part of the action could
be made arbitrarily negative by winding around in the appropriate direction. In
this case it would not seem to make sense to include the solutions with arbitrarily
negative action, so one might need to make some restriction on the number of times
the complex solution could wind around various singularities. However, it is not
clear to me what the correct procedure would be to accomplish this.
Nevertheless, it might turn out that somehow the correct procedure, once found,
would rule out using the Euclidean de Sitter extremum but would still allow the
inflationary solution. Again, at the moment this remains pure speculation, and it is
hard to see why something so simple as the Euclidean de Sitter 4-hemisphere (and
its analytic continuation into the Lorentzian regime) would be excluded.
(5) A related fifth conceivable resolution is that even if Euclidean de Sitter is an
allowed solution that would contribute to the Hartle-Hawking path integral with a
true cosmological constant, it (or a similar large 4-space) is not an allowed solution
with the actual quintessence or dark energy that drives the currently observed cosmic
acceleration. It is hard to see how quintessence or dark energy would not give a
Euclidean solution if a cosmological constant does, but I do not have a rigorous
proof against this, so I am therefore listing it as one of the conceivable possibilities.
(6) A sixth possibility is that whatever resolves the problem of the infinite mea-
sure in inflation might also in some way solve the problem raised by Susskind
(though I certainly don’t see why this would necessarily occur). Inflation, par-
ticularly eternal inflation [85, 86, 87, 88], seems to be able to lead to an arbi-
trarily large universe, with an arbitrarily large number of observers, which makes
it problematic how to calculate the probability of various observed features by
taking the ratio of the numbers of the corresponding infinite sets of observers
[89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 59, 60, 99]. It is conceivable that the res-
olution of this dilemma might also regulate the huge bare probability ascribed to
the nearly-empty de Sitter spacetime in the Hartle-Hawking path integral. However,
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it is also possible that the two problems are rather separate, so that a solution to
one will not immediately give a solution to the other.
(7) A seventh possible resolution of Susskind’s challenge is that the integral over
the initial value φ0 of the scalar field φ, being infinite if the φ has an infinite range,
will dominate over the huge but finite value of Pbare(de Sitter) ∼ e10122.44 . This is
the same type of argument that was used in [100] to say that the Hartle-Hawking
no-boundary proposal leads to the prediction that the flatness parameter has unit
probability to be Ω = 1 (in a minisuperspace model that did not include inhomoge-
neous modes that would realistically be expected to give some cosmic variance about
Ω = 1 in the observed part of the universe), despite the fact that the no-boundary
wavefunction peaks at the minimum possible value of inflation.
Although we did not refer to the tunneling wavefunction in this paper [100] on
the flatness of the universe, our argument for the infinite measure from the integral
over φ0 would also answer the challenge of Vilenkin [53] and others [54, 55, 56] that
the no-boundary proposal favors a small amount of inflation, whereas the tunneling
wavefunction favors a large amount. Our argument would imply that even if there
is a huge bare probability (i.e., before normalization) for a small amount of inflation
in the no-boundary proposal, if one includes an infinite range for the initial value φ0
of the inflaton field, that gives an infinite measure, which of course dominates over
the large but finite measure or bare probability for a small amount of inflation.
In the case of Susskind’s challenge from the huge negative action of a large
Euclidean de Sitter solution, the problem is quantitatively more acute, since the
action of a large Euclidean de Sitter solution is even enormously much more negative
than that of the smallest theoretical amount of inflation (φ0 ∼ 1, much smaller than
the observational lower limit for at least roughly 50 e-folds of inflation). However,
this huge negative action is still finite, so qualitatively the solution of an infinite
range for φ0 can still work just as it did in the previous case (assuming that it did
there).
It is amusing to consider the quantitative implications of this proposed resolution
of Susskind’s challenge. If one imagined that φ really has only a finite range but
attempted to make that range so large, say up to φmax, that the integral over dφ0
dominates over Pbare(de Sitter) ∼ e10122.44 , we would need φmax >∼ e10122.44 . Then if
V (φ) rises asymptotically as some power of φ, the amount of inflation as φ undergoes
slow roll from near φmax to near unity (at the end of inflation) is exponential in a
power of φmax. If this power is an exponent that is of the order of magnitude of
unity, then after inflation, the size of the universe will be at least of the crude order
of 1010
10
122
(meaning that the logarithm of the logarithm of the logarithm of the
size will be at least roughly 122). Of course, it is hard to imagine why φ would
have a finite range if its range extended up to at least roughly 1010
122
, so it seems
much more likely that φ would then simply have an infinite range. In that case,
the probability would then be unity that the universe would expand larger than
any fixed finite size. This is effectively almost the same as saying that the universe
will have an infinite amount of expansion, though strictly speaking “infinite” here
should be taken to mean just “arbitrarily large.”
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The main problem with this proposed resolution of Susskind’s challenge is that
it generally requires that the inflaton be allowed to be so large that its potential
gives energy densities far in excess of the Planck density (unless the potential levels
off below the Planck value, which is a distinct possibility, though perhaps one that
would be considered to be fine tuned). Then one might suppose that the inflaton
should be cut off at the Planck density. However, even while admitting that we
do not yet know what should happen at the Planck density, one might say [101]
that this cut off is ad hoc, so we cannot be sure that the proposed solution, with φ
allowed to be infinitely large (or at least as large as Pbare(de Sitter) ∼ e10122.44 ), is
not qualitatively valid. In other words, even though it may be doubtful that it is
really right, we cannot be sure it is wrong either.
A related problem is that if the inflaton comes from some modulus or other field
in superstring/M theory, there are conjectures that in the presence of gravity the
volume of the moduli space is finite (see, e.g., [102]). If so, the integral over the
allowed range of the inflaton field would give a finite answer that almost certainly
not compensate for Pbare(de Sitter). This means that it may be hard to combine
this proposed solution to Susskind’s challenge with superstring/M theory. However,
this is just an unproved conjecture [103], and the KKLT construction [104] suggests
that it may well be wrong.
(8) An eighth possible resolution of Susskind’s challenge is that the inflationary
component of the wavefunction expands to such an utterly enormous size that it
produces more ordered observers than the nearly empty de Sitter spacetime does
of disordered observers through vacuum fluctuations, even when one includes the
huge bare probability of the nearly empty de Sitter spacetime. For this resolution to
work, one would need to restrict the 4-volume of the de Sitter spacetime (e.g.,
by something that prevented it from lasting too long and expanding too many
times, perhaps the same thing that might prevent too many observers from occurring
by vacuum fluctuations in the future of our subuniverse [68, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62,
63]) so that it produces a strictly finite number of observers, and then allow the
inflationary universe to expand so much more that it produces more observers, even
after including the ratio of their bare probabilities that seems to weight the nearly-
empty de Sitter spacetime by such a large factor relative to the inflationary solution.
In the case of a minisuperspace comparison between the tunneling and the no-
boundary quantum states [101], for suitable potentials (including the simple massive
scalar inflaton), even deterministic slow roll without stochastic inflation can produce
enough volume from a large enough φ0 to compensate for the higher bare probability
of a small φ0 (and a resulting amount of inflation too small to be consistent with
observations), without having to go to φ0 so high that one exceeds the Planck den-
sity. However, for the same minisuperspace idea to save the no-boundary proposal
in comparison with the Euclidean de Sitter extremum, it appears that for most rea-
sonable potentials that rise indefinitely with the inflaton field, one would need to
allow the initial energy density to exceed the Planck value.
However, if one goes to stochastic or eternal inflation [85, 86, 87, 88], it appears
to allow the universe to inflate to arbitrarily large size even without the potential
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ever exceeding the Planck value (though for an ever-rising potential it does seem
that the stochastic evolution pictured for the scalar field would be required to be
rather finely tuned to avoid ever exceeding the Planck energy density; this problem
would not arise if the potential instead has a maximum value below the Planck
value [105]). In this case one could always get enough spatial volume, and hence
number of observers, in the inflationary solution to compensate for the enormous
unnormalized bare probability of the Euclidean de Sitter spacetime, assuming that
the latter somehow is not similarly allowed to inflate by a sufficient amount to
produce its own larger number of observers by vacuum fluctuations.
One might think that including the processes of stochastic inflation would take
one outside the zero-loop approximation advocated in [28] to avoid some of the
infinities of the path integral. However, one might conjecture that the effects of
stochastic inflation could arise from taking into account complex inhomogeneous
classical solutions of the field equations (extrema of the action). It would be very
interesting to see whether this indeed is the case.
Another way to get an arbitrarily large amount of inflation is to suppose that
the inflaton potential has a rather flat maximum, and that inflation starts at the
top of this hill [30, 31, 27]. In this case one could get homogeneous complex classical
extrema with arbitrarily large amounts of approximately real Lorentzian inflation,
expanding the universe to arbitrarily large size. However, one could object that the
de Sitter-like extrema corresponding to the currently observed cosmic acceleration
can also expand the universe to arbitrarily large size in the distant future, so it is
not obvious why the arbitrarily large size from rapid early inflation would dominate
over the arbitrarily large size from the slow late inflation.
Again it seems that we must imagine that for some reason the large nearly-empty
de Sitter solution cannot do something that the rapid-inflation solution can. In the
first proposed resolution above, it was the formation of observers that was proposed
to be denied the nearly-empty de Sitter solution. In the second suggestion it was
supposed that the nearly-empty de Sitter solution cannot be attached by a bridge
to another large 4-sphere to make its Euclidean action enormously more negative as
it was proposed could happen to the inflationary solution. In the third speculation,
it was supposed that the nearly-empty de Sitter solution cannot be combined with
another space to give an actual extremum with greatly reduced action, even though
it was conjectured that this might be able to be done for the inflationary solution.
In the fourth suggestion, it was proposed that Euclidean de Sitter is not actually an
allowed extremum for the Hartle-Hawking path integral, whereas the inflationary
solution supposedly is. In the fifth idea, it was suggested that Euclidean de Sitter
might not be a solution at all for whatever it actually is that is driving the currently
observed cosmic acceleration. In the more vague sixth proposal, the solution to the
infinite measure problem is supposed to reduce the na¨ıve de Sitter bare probability
much more than that of inflation. In the seventh proposed solution to Susskind’s
challenge, it is the arbitrarily large range of φ0 that the inflationary solutions have
that the de Sitter solution does not have. (Here it perhaps is most easy to see the
distinction between the two solutions, which is why I am perhaps most attracted to
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this possibility.) Finally, in the eighth possibility, it is proposed that the de Sitter
space cannot expand large enough to produce arbitrarily many observers (by vacuum
fluctuations), even though the inflationary universe can (though in this case by the
ordinary evolutionary process that we believe occurred in our observed subuniverse).
Thus we have at least an eight-fold way of potential solutions to save the Hartle-
Hawking no-boundary proposal (and what it might explain, such as the mysterious
arrow of time) from Susskind’s challenge. As one can see from the discussion above,
I am not too happy with any of them, but at the moment I would guess that the
seventh, with the infinite measure from the integration over an infinite range of
possible initial values of the inflaton scalar field φ, seems the least unattractive.
Other Possibilities
Since it is not certain whether any of these eight proposals (or others I have not yet
thought of or that other people might propose) really give a satisfactory resolution
of Susskind’s challenge, let us now turn to the possibility that the Hartle-Hawking
no-boundary proposal is wrong and that one should turn to another proposal for the
quantum state of the universe. Here I shall just examine the tunneling proposals of
Vilenkin, Linde, and others [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35].
For the present purposes, the main difference from the Hartle-Hawking proposal
will be taken to be the sign of the Euclidean action for at least the homogeneous
isotropic complex Euclidean FRW solutions like Euclidean de Sitter and FRW in-
flation [31, 30]. (It seems problematic to take the opposite sign for inhomogeneous
and/or anisotropic perturbations without leading to some instabilities, and it is not
clear how to give a sharp distinction between the modes that are supposed to have
the reversed sign of the action and the modes that are supposed to retain the usual
sign of the action, but for this paper I shall generally leave aside this and related
problems [106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111]. Vilenkin has emphasized [30] that this crit-
icism does not seem to apply to his tunneling proposal, which does not simply have
the reversed sign of the Euclidean action for all modes, but here I shall just focus
on the homogeneous mode, for which Vilenkin’s proposal effectively does have the
opposite sign.)
In this case the Euclidean de Sitter solution would give
Pbare(de Sitter) = e
+2SE(dS) = e−pia
2
dS = e−3pi/Λ ∼ e−10122.44 . (13)
Assuming that a vacuum fluctuation producing an observer has the usual sign of
the Euclidean action, one would then get
Pobservation,unnormalized(de Sitter) ∼ exp (−10122.44 − 1069.4). (14)
These bare probabilities could then be compared with the inflationary probabil-
ities
Pbare(inflation) = e
+2SE(inflation) = e−pia
2
0 = e−3/[8V(φ0)]
>∼ e−1010.6 (15)
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and
Pobservation,unnormalized(inflation)
>∼ e−1010.6 . (16)
This dominates the corresponding Pobservation,unnormalized(de Sitter), so if we again
normalize be dividing by the total unnormalized probability for observations, for
the tunneling wavefunction we now get that the normalized probability for an ob-
servation to occur in an inflationary solution would be
Pobservation(inflation) ∼ 1. (17)
Thus the tunneling wavefunction would be consistent with our ordered observations
in this way (at least if one could solve the other problems associated with it).
It is a bit disconcerting that the controversy between the no-boundary and tun-
neling wavefunctions [106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111] has not yet been resolved. In
terms of the numbers above, they give probabilities of large empty de Sitter space-
times that differ by a factor of more than 1010
122
, which is the ten thousand million
million millionth power of a googolplex! However, even this might pale beside the
uncertainties of whether the various infinite factors discussed above should be in-
cluded (particularly that of the integration over an infinite range of the initial value
φ0 of the inflaton).
One argument [85, 86, 87, 88, 90] is that at very late times, where the volume
of space has grown so large that that is where almost all observers are expected to
be, eternal inflation leads to the same predictions for all of the various proposed
wavefunctions. This picture is now being explored in the context of the string land-
scape [56, 104, 45, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 15, 117, 118, 119, 120, 102], with one
of the recent ideas being that the probabilities of the various string vacua depends
not only on the various actions but also on the decay rates [98, 121, 60]. Whether
these ideas can be cast into the form of the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal
or are consistent with it remains to be fully explored. On the other hand, the canon-
ical classical measure [122, 123] gives an ambiguous probability for inflation [124].
Gibbons and Turok have recently shown [125] that the divergence in the canonical
measure is removed if one identifies universes which are so flat they cannot be ob-
servationally distinguished by observers like us, living in the late universe but with
access to only a finite portion of space in the past. With this identification of very
flat universes, the canonical measure becomes finite, and it gives an exponentially
small probability for a large number of inflationary e-foldings. However, [124] also
implies that one can alternatively choose other cutoffs in which the probability of
inflation is large [126]. These examples show that it is certainly not the case that all
choices of measure (or initial conditions or wavefunctions) lead to the same predic-
tions, so one would really like to know what the quantum state is and what measure
it predicts for observations.
In summary, Susskind has raised a serious challenge to the Hartle-Hawking no-
boundary proposal for the quantum state of the universe. There are several potential
resolutions of this challenge, but it is not yet clear whether any of them is satis-
factory. If no resolutions can be found, the challenge leaves us with the mystery of
what the quantum state might be to be consistent with our observations.
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